effective. Second, enclaves have low employm ent ra tes b ecause they have large populations of refu gees. In order to counter this trend, policy sh ould distribute refu gees evenly throughout the country and conti nue to foc us on reso urces for refu gees.
T his paper divides th e enclave-employm ent paradox into two parts. Accordingly, section on e addresses why immigrants w ho relocate have high employment rates, and section two addresses w hy inunigrant enclaves still have low employment rates. Section 1. 1 reviews recent literature's claims about the causes and consequences of immigrant enclaves, lays out this paper's m ethod fo r testing these claims, and describes this paper's hypothesis and causal logic. Section 1.2 prese nts evidence for tlus hyp othesis, and section 1.3 gives some prelinunary conclusions. Section two addresses low employm ent in imnligrant enclaves.
.IMMIGRANT CULTURE, DANISH INSTITUTIONS, AND A DIRE FUTURE
R ecent literature gives two explanations for w hy imnugrant enclaves em erge and one prediction fo r w hat enclaves mean for the future. The first explanation identifies inmugrant culture as the root cause, the second explanation suggests that institutio ns are the cause. B oth predict that, without dramatic changes, D enmark is h eaded toward a dire future. The first explanation assumes that immigrants congregate for primarily cultural reasons, or m ore precisely, that their conunon Islanuc religion gives inmugrants strong incentives to create close conmmnities (Camre 2007, 195) . T his ratio nale assumes that living in an ethnic enclave strengthens an imm igrant's sense of security, solidarity and identity (D anun and R oshohn 2005 , 19) . Trus explanation offers two solutions to the problems imnligrant enclaves potentially pose. It presents massive culture chan ge or complete repatriation to the h om e country as the only viable solutions (Camre 2007 , 211 / N annestad and Svendsen 2005, 29) . Both of these options would be H erculean and costly tasks . If, as the cultural approach contends, these are the only options, D anish society faces a serious, and potentially paralyzing, dilenuna.
T he second explanatio n suggests that bad institutio ns cause inmugrant enclaves. Trus approac h argues that integration m easures h ave n ot only been na· ive, but also counterproductive. For example, Bawer claim s that policy has caused " pillarization," or the segm enting of society into ethnic groups.3 Imnugratio n policy, according to Bawer, often exposes a type of latent European bigotry that, on the one hand, embraces diversity w hile harboring a fear of foreigners on the other (2006, 74) . This explanation essentially accepts the cultural approach , but adds that poor policy has exacerbated the problem of imnugrant enclaves. Whatever their differences, bo th viewpoints predict catastrophic econ omic consequences and poor integration outcom es if enclaves continue to develop (Camre 2007 , 196/ Bawer 2006 . These two explanations claim that either institutions or culture cause inunigrant enclaves. T his paper will test these two explanations by looking at inunigrant relocation behavior.
A look at inunigrant relocation behavior w ill deternune w hether culture or institutions cause imnugrant enclaves to fo rm. R elocatio n is an inu1ugrant's choice to m ove away fro m the policy-assigned place of residen ce. D anish policy, as previously mention ed , places inll1ugrants according to an equal geograpruc distribution, so the individual choice to relocate provides a uniqu e access point to analyze inunigrant preferences (see appendix A). Two patterns em erge w hen looking at inmugrant relocatio n behavior. First, inmugrants that participate in an integration program are less likely to relocate during the first two years in D enmark, and m ore likely to relocate after the first two yea rs. Conversely, inunigrants that http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2008/iss1/6 do not participate in an integration program are more likely to move during the first two years in Denmark, and less likely to move after the first two years (Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 31) . In other words, integration prograuls seem to affect when an immigrant relocates. A second relocation pattern emerges regarding place of residence and size of municipality. When an inllnigrant's place of residence is in a small municipality, the immigrant is more likely to relocate. Conversely, when place of residence is in a large municipality, immigrants are less likely to relocate (Dan1l11 and Rosholm 2005, 22) . This suggests that the characteristics of large and small municipalities are potential causes for relocation among inllnigrants. These two relocation patterns indicate that institutions such as municipality characteristics and integration programs are plausible causes for enclaves to form. Accordingly, institutions constitute my first independent variable in this question. I divide institutions into three categories: municipal integration resources, Denmark's immigrant-placement policy, and underlying labor market institutions. Denmark's municipal integration resources offer recent arrivals a variety of ways to improve their employability. I define municipal integration resources as Denmark's post-1999 job training and language education programs. This paper measures labor market institutions in terms of municipal unemployment rates. This assumes that municipal unemployment rates are fairly good markers for underlying labor market institutions. Denm.ark uses a placement policy for persons that arrive as refugees. This policy distributes Denmark's annual intake of refugees using regional quotas. Between 1986 and 1997 , the dispersal policy provided 90% of refugees with their initial place of residence (Liebig 2007, 17) . If I find that institutions account for most of the relocation patterns among in1l1ugrants, I will accept the institutional explanation for why in1l1ugrant enclaves develop.
Inllnigrant culture is my second independent variable. I define i1lllnigrant culture simply as the desire to live in a residential district where the foreign-born population is at least 50%. For a recent arrival, co-ethnic networks are a valuable resource for finding a job. But if culture causes in1l1ugrant enclaves to form, finding a job should not be the sole incentive to live am.ong co-ethnics. Thus if culture is truly a cause, employment opportunities should not completely account for relocation behavior among in1l1ugrants. In other words, if I find that jobs do not account for most relocation behavior among in1l1ugrants, I will not reject the cultural explanation. If institutions cause enclaves to form , the incentives from institutions should affect relocation behavior more than the incentives to live among co-ethnics. From the evidence in the next section, this paper does not reject the cultural explanation, accepts the institutional explanation and asserts that the prediction of a dire future for Denmark is exaggerated.
INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS AND POSITIVE OUTCOMES
Data on municipality size, employment rates, and relocation support the institutional explanation for why enclaves form. Men who live in smaller municipalities, compared to men who reside in a large municipality, have a 33% to 84% higher relocation rate; for women, the corresponding rates are 66% and 102% (Danlln and Rosholm 2005, 22) . In other words, larger municipalities have lower rates of relocation, and smaller municipalities have higher rates of relocation. This evidence can support both the institutional and cultural explanation for relocation.
To explain this correlation between size of municipality and rate of relocation, the institutional approach argues that municipal integration resources might affect the relocation Understanding Immigrant Behavior in Denmark rate. This is because smaller municipalities often lack integration resources for incoming immigrants due to either a lack of experience or declining numbers of immigrants. Smaller numbers of immigrants make it difficult to gen erate scale economies for j ob training and language education (Liebig 2007, 62) . T his might give incentive for inulligrants to shop for better options in larger municipalities that have well-established scale economies and a broader ra nge of vocati onal and language educatio n resources. In other words, the institutional app roach argues that integration resources strongly influence an inunigrant's decision to m ove to larger municipalities.
Nielsen and Jensen 's findings support this institutio nal explanatio n. They compare the relative effects of the post-1999 integration program and municipality size on inulligrant relocation rates. T hey find that 6% of inulligrants in the program m ove to larger municipalities. Comparatively, 36% of immigrants not in the integration program move to larger municipaliti es (Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 43) . Furthermore, participation in the integration program has a larger effect on relocation than civil status, age, and children effects (Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 33-57) . This suggests that there is a link between integration resources and an inUlugrant's decision to relocate. In other words, evidence suppo rts this paper's thesis that institutions strongly affect relocation behavior.
The cultural perspective offers an alternative to this institutio nal argu m ent. This approach argues that because larger municipalities have larger am ounts of co-ethnics, inunigrants tend to move to larger municipalities (Chiswick and Miller 2002, 4) . Evidence supports this rationale, but it does not prove that culture m otivates relocation. As an example, a 1% increase in the local number of inulligrants decreases the relocation rate by 9. 5% for m en and 17% for wom en (D amm and R osholm 2005, 22) . As the number of immigrants increases in an area, the greater the likelihood that inulligrants will choose to stay. Conversely, as iml1ugrants become less numerous, the m ore inunigrants tend to move. This pattern suggests that cultural preference to live aillong co-ethnics may account for an increase in the rate of relocation. H owever, other evidence shows that economic preference m ay account for this pattern as well . Co-ethnic networks account for 55% of the employed inunigrant population, whereas institutions account for 15% of j obs am ong the employed inUlugrant population (Schultz-Nielsen 2005, 75) .4 Comparatively, networks account for 44% of j obs am ong employed Danes w here institutions account for 10% of j obs (SchultzNielsen 2005, 75) . In other words , co-ethnic networks are relatively m ore important for an imnugrant's employm ent opportunities than for a D ane's .
This suggests that employm ent opportunities motivate immigrants to form enclaves. While culture may still motivate il1Ulugrants to live am ong co-ethlucs, the evidence does not directly prove this explanation. Instead , it strongly suggests that underlying labor market institutions affect relocatio n behavior am ong inUlugrants. So far, evidence supports the institutional explanation because it shows that integration resources decrease relocation rates by 30% (Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 43) . Further evidence suggests that lab or m arket institutions likely affect place of relocation. To further test whether labor market institutions cause relocation and what the consequences of enclaves are for employm ent, I look at municipal unemploym ent rates.
Municipal unemploym ent rates affect w here inUlugrants m ove to, but have only a slight effect on h ow often inunigrants relocate. Interestingly, inUlugrants that relocate have higher rates of employm ent compared to il1Ulugrants that do not relocate (D anull and Rosholm 2005, 23-24/ Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 46-47). In addition , inllnigrants tend to http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2008/iss1/6 move away from municipalities with high unemployment rates (Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 46) . This strongly suggests that employment opportunity motivates relocation among immigrants; however, both studies by Danm1/ Rosholm and Nielsen/Jensen counter with this institutional approach with an important point. After controlling for socioeconomic factors, they suggest that employment rates alone are not enough to account for inmugrants' decision to move. However, the evidence does suggest that municipal unemployment rates help inmugrant enclaves to form insofar as they affect the place of relocation. To tlus !inuted extent, this supports this paper's thesis that institutions help cause enclaves to form. So far, institutions seem to affect relocation behavior slightly more than immigrant culture. And if institutions have a stronger influence, it suggests that changing policy is a viable option for changing inmugrant relocation behavior. This is important because it counters the notion that complete repatriation or massive culture change are the only viable solutions for the low inmugrant employment rates. In order to find how institutions might be part of a third solution, the next portion of this paper exanunes the econonuc effects of inmugrant enclaves.
Evidence decisively counters the prediction that imnugrant enclaves lead to poor econonuc and integration outcomes. Most inmugrant enclaves develop in large municipalities. Large municipalities , on average, have more favorable labor market characteristics (Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 46/ Danun and Rosholin 2005, 24) . Favorable labor market characteristics accelerate the speed at which inmugrants find their first job (Danun and Rosholin 2005, 20) . And having a job significantly increases the rate of language acquisition, even after controlling for socio-econonuc characteristics (Clausen and Husted 2005,13) . This suggests that the development of inmugrant enclaves provide positive economic and integration outcomes.
These positive outcomes call into question the effectiveness of Denmark's inmugrantplacement policy. Using a counterfactual-simulation model, Damm and Rosholm find that the pre-1 999 placement policy did not promote the integration process. Indeed, a removal of the policy might have quickened integration rates, because the immigrant relocation process delayed their entrance into the labilr market (Danun and Roshom 2005,29) . This suggests that an equal distribution of inunigrants may not be optimal policy. Despite this, the post-1999 policy still operates on the assumption that an even spread of inmugrants is best, and distinguishes itself from the previous policy by discouraging relocation. It discourages relocation by withholding integration resources from inunigrants that move. If D anun and Rosholin's counterfactual predictions are correct, the post-1999 policy should then still be delaying integration rates. Prelinunary evidence supports this prediction in the long-term, but suggests that this is not the case for the first four years of residence. In fi gure 1, the post-1999 policy seems to increase imnugrant employment rates for the first four years relative to the pre-1999 policy (Leibig 2007, 35) .
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The initial increase in employm ent rates corresponds to the four-year integration programs that municipalities implem ented under the post-1 999 policy. This suggests that integration resources play a critical role in improving employment and integration outcomes for immigrants. After the first four years of residence, h owever, the post-1999 policy seems n ot to have any distinct advantage over the previous policy. Post-1 999 employm ent rates even dip below previous rates at the seven-year mark . A plausible .; explanation for this is that the incentive for an immigrant to relocate might be latent due to integration program s in the first four years. Tlus suggests that, after the first four years, the post-1999 policy has the same inefficiencies as its predecessor, and that Damm and R osholm's prediction is still at play. In other words, inunigrant-placement policy m ay still be slowing the integration process in the long term . This conclusion is tentative because this policy is relatively new and its long-term effects renun largely unknown. The prelinunary eviden ce does however support this paper's thesis about how D enmark could improve its inmugrant-placem ent policy, namely, that policy can improve by taking municipal integration resources and inmugrant preferences into greater consideration. By increasing integration resources, the post-1 999 policy improved short-term employm ent outcom es. To improve long-term employment outcomes, policy should let irml1igrant preferences deternune initial placem ent.
INSTITUTIONS AND IMPROVING IMMIGRANT-PLACEMENT POLICY
SO far the evidence offers some prelinunary conclusions. Inmugrants relocate to enclaves for access to integration resources and co-ethnic n etworks. Econonuc m otives likely explain why inmugrants want access to co-ethnic networks, but cultural reasons are http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2008/iss1/6 still plausible. Muni cipal integration resources and unemployment rates help cause inillligrant enclaves to form. Integratio n resources increase relocation rates. Unemployment rates affect the destinatio n of imnligrant relocation . Because institutions seem to encourage the developm ent of immigrant enclaves, I accept tllis part of the institutional approach. Because inunigrant culture remains plausible, I do not reject the cultural approach. This does not mean policymakers should discard inunigrant culture as a cause, but rather, that they should put it into proper perspective.
In addition, immigrant enclaves lead to certain positive employment and integrati on outcomes. This counters the prediction that enclaves signal a dire future for Denmark. Policym akers often assume that enclaves slow the rate of integration; however, the evidence suggests that relocation increases the rate of integration. Policymakers also assume that imnligrant enclaves develop in places with low labor demand; however, relocation clearly increases employm ent opportunities for inillligrants. In making these conclusions, this paper assumes that imnligrants relocate to places w here enclaves are developing. Nielsen and Jensen 's data supports this assumption (see Appendix B). In short, the prediction that inunigrant enclaves wi]] lead to poor econonll c and integration outcomes seems exaggerated and inaccurate. In light of tllis, Dallish immigrant-placement policy sh ould do two things. Policy should continue to support municipal integratio n resources and begin to allow immigrant preferen ce to determ.ine the initial place of residence. The next section will provide evidence that supports these policy reconunendations.
Low EMPLOYMENT IN IMMIGRANT ENCLAVES
Up to this point, this paper has accounted for the latter part of the enclaveemploym ent paradox. R emember, the paradox is that wllile immigrant enclaves have low employment rates, inunigrants that move to enclaves have high employment rates (Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 41 I Danun and R osholm 2005,22) . This paper has thus far maintained that enclaves help integration because inunigrants that move to them are more likely to get a job. The question then remains, if inunigrant enclaves help, why do they still hurt? In other words, what accounts fo r the low employment rates in inunigrant enclaves? This section asserts that the high number of refu gees in inunigrant enclaves largely accounts for low employm ent rates.
This part of the enclave-employment paradox is relevant for Danish policymakers. Currently, the employment gap between the non-OECD and native population is fourteen percentage points in Derunark (Liebig 2007, 11) . In addition, most non-OECD inillligrants in D enmark live in enclaves (Clausen and Hununelgaard 2007, 20) .This suggests that a close look at the conditions of inunigrant enclaves could lend insight as to w hy employm ent rates remain low among inunigrants. Ultimately, a better understanding of enclave conditions could lead to better policy decisions. Thus, the next portion of this paper will investigate whether institutio nal, cultural , or reason-for-migration effects account for low employment among inunigrants in enclaves. 6 This paper asserts that, while the institutional and cultural fa ctors have an influence, inunigrants' reason-for-nligration in large measure accounts for low employment in imnligrant enclaves. Section 2.1 addresses recent literature's claims and lays out this paper's method for testing these claims. Sections 2.2 , 2.3,2.4, and 2.5 consider the impact of integration m easures, welfare program s, reason-for-lnigrationl country-oforigin, and self-employment respectively on enclave employm ent rates. Section 2.6 concludes.
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IMMIGRANT CULTURE, NATIVE INSTITUTIONS OR REFUGEES
COl1mlOn explanations for inmugrant low employment break along cultural and institutional lines. The cultural camp asserts that Muslims have a strong aversion to work (Camre 2006, 207) . Tlus approach argues that because of Islamic culture, only a small number of non-OECD inmugrants will be able to work in a western society (Camre 2006, 195) . An example of the cultural rationale here is instructive. A devout Muslim will refuse to work in a place that may result in interaction with the opposite sex, or where employers do not allow for prayers five times a day. For followers of the Wahabi order of Islam, appearance plays an important role. Wahabi males will generally grow beards and wear a hat. Thus, when a profession requires the removal of beards and hats,Wahabi Muslims will often disnuss the employment opportunity. Self-employment thus becomes an attractive option for the devout Muslim inmugrant because it allows them to earn money without compromising religion. But if Islanuc culture causes low employment among non-western immigrants, how does one account for low employment among western inmugrants as well? Inmligrants in Denmark, regardless of where they come from, have lower em.ployment rates than the native-born population (Liebig 2007, 5) .
The second explanation accounts for this exception by adding that institutions also cause low employment among non-western inmugrants. This approach argues that Danish institutions, reflected in low returns on foreign qualifications, restrict many imnugrants from entering the workforce (Nannestad 1999, 196-197/Clausen and Hunm1elgaard 2007,21) . Prohibitive policy, according to this argument, reflects a bigotry that is willing to donate aid to foreign countries but labels foreigners as incapable of work or undesirable as colleagues (Bawer 2006,70-72) . The first app· roach faults inmugrant culture where the second blames native institutions for the low employment rates in inurugrant enclaves. Whether the explanation· is culture or institutions is an important question . If enclaves have poor employment because of culture, it leaves Denmark with two Herculean tasks: either largescale culture change or massive repatriation. If enclaves have poor employment because of policy, however, it leaves Denmark with a more feasible choice: namely, to improve its institutions in inmugrant enclaves. While these are not the only two explanations, they both are mainstays in public opinion and official policy (Gaasholt and Togeby 1995 , 147-65) .
To address this part of the enclave-employment paradox, I operationalize institutions as integration measures and welfare programs. I operationalize culture as country-of-origin effects and an imnugrant's choice to be unemployed rather than self-employed. To evaluate this paper's thesis that refugees largely account for low enclave employment, I operationalize refugee as an illmugrant's reason-for-nugration. I defend these choices in the sections to follow.
IMPACT OF INTEGRATION MEASURES ON EMPLOYMENT
If, as the institutional approach suggests, a lack of integration measures lower employment, then as integration measures improve, there should be a corresponding rise in employment rates. Evidence supports this hypothesis. After 1999 and especially after 2001, Denmark adopted sweeping measures that focused on integration. In the years that followed , non-western inmugrants that had arrived within one to seven years began to enter the labor market more quickly and more often relative to the pre-1999 policy, as can be seen in Figure 1 . The new integration policy accelerated the trend of convergence between foreign-and native-born employment rates and increased employment probabilities for http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2008/iss1/6 immigrants across the board (Liebig 2007, 35) . Tills evidence suggests that integration measures strongly affect employment rates in the short-term. In Figure 1 , the accelerated rate of employm ent in the first seven years of residence supports the prediction that institutions influence employm ent. H owever, the slight downward turn after the seven-year mark complicates the picture. Why do institutional effects decrease after the first sevenyears? T he cultural approach offers an explanation for tills downward turn. For example, employment might taper off because of receding integratio n incentives and resurgent country-of-origin effects, su ch as Islamic culture. The features shown in Figure 1 do not support disprove tills explanation, so it remains plausible. So far, the evidence could support either explanation. Another study helps locate the causes for these patterns more precisely.
During the sam e time period (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , municipal integration measures accounted for 22% of the employment rate among inunigrants. N o n-municipal causes---such as immigrant age, civil status, children, period of residence, h ealth , and country-of-originaccounted for 78% of the inu11.igrant employment rates (Husted and Nielsen and H einesen 2007,9) . Tlus shows, in a fairly precise way, that sometillng other than institutions has a large effe ct on employm.ent rates in enclaves. The fact that country-of-origin is in the 78% group suggests that culture may have a stronger effect than institutions o n inunigr.mt employment. Furthermore, the data from the study show that integration measures are most effective in areas with inU1ugrant enclaves. As an example of tills, Figure 2 shows that integration programs have above average success rates in municipalities with large numbers of immigrant enclaves (Husted and Nielsen and H einesen 2007,59-60) . Figure 2 also shows that integration program s have below average success rates in municipalities with little o r no enclaves. In short, integration programs in municipalities with enclaves produce better employment outcomes compared to municipalities with little or no enclaves. Tills suppo rts the rationale that, because small municipalities lack scale econonues for integration programs, inu11.igrants have poorer employment outcomes in smaller municipalities (Liebig 2007, 62) . It also suggests that integration measures do not lower employment rates in inunigrant enclaves. So far, it seems institutions help employment rates in enclaves wh.ile i.l1unigrant culture effects on enclave-employment rates rem ain unclear. N ext, this paper will deternune w hether welfare programs are an institutional cause for low employm.ent in enclaves.
IMPACT OF WELFARE PROGRAMS ON EMPLOYMENT
If the institutional explanation is correct, than welfare programs should discourage inmugrant employment. Evidence supports tills explanation . Welfare programs lead to lower employment rates among inunigrants because they give strong incentives to remain Understanding Immigrant Behavior in Denmark unemployed . D enmark's welfa re benefits for the unemployed are alllong the highest in the OEeD. Tlus is b ecause D enmark 's welfare schem e relies on flat-rate benefits, w hich result in very high net replacem ent ra tes for low form er incom e levels (Liebig 2007, 37) . T hese features can lead to an odd incentive situation called an unemploym ent trap, w here the incentives of unemploym ent offset the incentives of employm ent (Pedersen 2005, 17) . M any inunigrants in D enmark are in unemploym ent traps. Between 15-30% of unemployed inunigrants would lose m oney by working (Schultz-Nielsen 2001, 55) . Equally important are inunigrant perceptions about unemploym ent adva ntages. Here, Schultz-Nielsen finds that 22% of unemployed non-western inunigrants believed they would receive less or equal pay if they had a j ob (2001, 80) . This suggests that unemploym ent can, in some cases, be an econonlic preference instead of a cultural choice. T his supports the institutional explanation for low employm ent outcom es.
Other surveys about unemploym ent benefits support the cultural explanation . Schultz-Nielsen observes that un employed inmugrants were less willing to accept long conU1ll1te times for a n ew j ob than unemployed D anes (2001, (77) (78) . Whether this difference in preference reflects a difference in culture is unclear, but a cultural explanation is certainly plausible. O n the other hand, unemployed inunigrants were about as w illing as D anes to m ove in o rder get a new j ob (Schultz-Nielsen 200 1,80) . In sum, it seems that high unemploym ent benefits discourage employm ent among inunigrants with low incom e, and unemployed inmugrants seem somewhat less willing than unemployed D anes to becom e employed . In short, welfare programs lead to lower employm ent outcom es. In this category, institutions hurt m ore than they help, but in b oth categories so fa r, inunigrant culture effects rem ain at play. To test for inunigrant culture, the next porti on of this paper will compare country-of-origin effects relative to reason-for-nugration effects.
COUNTRY-Of-ORIGIN AND REASON-fOR-MIGRATION EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT
If the cultural explanation is tru e, then an inmugrant's country-of-origin should have a larger effect on employm ent than an inmugrant's reason to inmugrate. For the following analysis, an inunigrant's status as a refugee or non-refu gee will represent the reason-fornugration. Evidence strongly counters the cultural explanation. R efu gees have signifi cantly lower employm ent rates than non-refu gee inunigrants (Liebig 2007, 69) . In addition, data shows that reason-for-nugration effects clearly o utweigh the impact of country-of-origin effects on imnligrant employment rates (Liebig 2007, 69) . Another study supports these findings. Male refu gees from Sri Lanka, Iran and Iraq have 39% employment compared to 66% for male non-refu gees from the sam e countries. In all, there is a 30% difference in employm ent rates between refu gees and non-refu gees in D enmark (Husted et . aI 2000, 8/ Husted and Nielsen and H einesen 2007, 84) . In other words, the employment gap between refu gees and non-refu gees (30%) is comparable to the gap between natives and inunigrants (30.5%). This evidence brings forward an important question. H ow do non-refu gee il1mugrant employm ent rates compare to native-born employment rates for this tim e period? This is a relevant question because if the n on-refu gee rate is comparable to the native rate, it would also strongly counter the cultural explanation for low inunigrant employm ent rates. It would suggest that refu gees largely acco unt for overall low employm ent rates am ong inmugrants.
This, however, is not the case. Among males, the native-born employm ent ra te is 89% compared to 72% am ong non-refu gee imnugrants (Husted et. a] 2000,8) . This suggests that http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2008/iss1/6 other fac tors must account for the remaining 13% gap. In other wo rds, this shows that the inunigrant culture might account for the gap. Furtherm ore, if this 2001 study included women, it would probably widen the non-refu gee/native employm ent gap. This is because immigrant women have lower employment rates than native-born women (Nielsen et . al 2000, 1) . Tlus also suggests inmugrant culture nught discourage women from entering the workforce. In other words, imm.igrant culture partially accounts for ove rall low employment among inmugrants. But this only sh ows how culture affects inunigrant employment overall. It does n ot suggest that culture affects enclave-employm ent rates to the same degree. Indeed , further evidence suggests that reason-for-migration effects largely account for low enclave employm ent rates.
R efu gees largely account fo r low employm ent rates in inmugrant enclaves. With refu gees and non-refu gees included, the 1995 employm ent rate was 58.5%. Without refu gees, the employm ent rate was 72% (Husted et. al 2000,8) . Thus refu gees lowered the inmugrant employm ent rate by 13.5%. This is especially telling for employm ent in enclaves because D anish policy in 1995 placed refu gees in large municipalities where enclaves were m ore likely to form (Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 59) . This evidence supports tlus paper's thesis that refu gees largely acco unt for low employment in inun.igrant enclaves. In sum, reasonfor-nugration effects clearly outweigh country-of-origin effects on inlln.igrant employm ent rates. Wlule inmugrant culture possibly affects employment rates overall, the reason-fornugration definitely affects enclave-employment rates. To further test for inmugrant culture effects, the n ext section will deternune whether imnugrants prefer unemployment to selfemploym ent.
IMMIGRANT CULTURE EFFECTS ON SELF-EMPLOYMENT
The cultural approach argues that Islanuc culture engenders a strong aversion to work among inun.igrants. If this rationale is true, then inun.igrants that learn of and qualify for benefits over time should becom e gradually more dependent on welfare programs. Evidence counters this prediction . D ata shows that as an inun.igrant's years of residence increase, the level of welfare dependency decreases (Blume and Verner 2007, 14,31 ) . In other words, nonwestern inun.igrants tend to becom e self-sufficient as they stay in D enmark longer. This strongly counters the claim that culture engenders an aversion to work among immigrants. The cultural approach also asserts that inmugrant culture affects the preferred m ode of employm ent among inmugrants. If this is true, inun.igrants nught select self-employment even at the price of earning less than other inmugrant wage earners. This approach asserts that benefits from self-employm ent outweigh the cost of earning less because it allows an inmugrant to run a business without compronusing religio us belief. Evidence supports this pred.iction (see Figure 3 ) (Andersson and Wadensj o 2004, 16) . Wage earners $30,3 58
Self-employed $13,665
Difference in annual wages $16,873
Compared to non-western inun.igrant wage earners, self-employed non-western inmugrants earn alm.ost $17,000 dollars less per year. Even compared to unemployed D anes, self-employed inlln.igrants earn less (Liebig 2007, 40) . In other words, inmugrants are willing Understanding Immigrant Behavior in Denmark to be self-e mployed even when that means earning less than wage earners. This suggests that immigrants might ch oose self-employm ent for cultural reasons . H owever, further evidence counters this cultural interpretation. Recent data shows that self-employm ent is an escape ro ute o ut of unemployment fo r many non-western immigrants (Blume et. al 2005 , 221 Andersson and Wadensj o 2004, 16 ). In addition , b ecause wages and labor demand are particularly low in immigrant enclaves compared to other areas, m ore immigrants in enclaves prefer self-employment, w here they can rely o n the enclave fo r continu ed business (Constant and Z immerman 2005, 13/ Leibig 2007, 48) . In other words, no n-western inunigrants do not necessarily prefer self-employment to wage earning, but simply prefer self-employm ent to unemployment. T his suggests that inunigrants do not choose selfem ploym ent for cultural reasons, but rather, choose self-employm ent in order to be m ore self-sufficient. Liebig com es to a similar conclusion (2007, 38) . In sum, the evidence shows that inmligrants over time depend less on welfare and suggests that immigrants prefer selfemployment to welfare dependency.Tllis evidence directly counters the cultu ral explanation b ecause it dem onstrates that inmligrants' aversion to unemployment is stronger than their aversion to work.
REFUGEES, ENCLAVES AND EMPLOYMENT
O n balance, it seems that willie institutions and inmligrant culture have an influence, the reason-for-migration in large measure acco unts for low employment in inm ligrant enclaves. Institutions h ave an impact, but because integration m easures and welfa re programs respectively encourage and discourage employm ent in inmligrant enclaves, it remains difficult to detennine the net effect. Inulligrant culture may affect overall employm ent rates, but compared to the reason-for-nligration, the latter likely has a larger effect on enclave employm ent rates. R efu gees in imnligrant enclaves clearly lower employm ent rates. O f the three variables this section addressed, the reason-fo r-nligration seems to have the largest effect . T his suggests that imnligrant enclaves are far less burdensom e than the refu gees within them are.
In light of this, policymakers should focus legislation o n refu gees rather than immigrant enclaves. Placement-policy sho uld distribute refu gees evenly througho ut the country to spread costs am ong municipalities. For no n-refugees, however, policy should allow inunigrant preference and municipal integration resources to deternline initial placement. In addition , policymakers should consider encouraging entrepeneurship am ong inmligrants, foster more lucrative options for the self-employed , and m ove away fro m a flatrate benefit schem e fo r the unemployed . These suggestions com e with a small caveat, however, as there are certain drawbacks to this paper's m ethods.
T his paper has (at least) two Iinlitatio ns-one large and on e small . The large limitation is that this paper's three variables-reason-for-nligration, institutions, and inunigrant culture-do n ot offer a complete picture for why low employm ent rates persist in imnligrant enclaves . R ecent studies strongly suggest that other causes are at play. These include age, civil status, number of children , health, local labor demand, and employer behavior (Husted and Nielsen and H einesen 2007 , 84/ Nielsen and Jensen 2006 , 33-571 Leibig 2007 , 48, 59/ C lausen and HUllUnelgaard 2007 . Because this paper does not evaluate these variables, it cannot offer a compreh ensive expla natio n for the enclaveemploym ent paradox. The small Iinlitation is that this paper nlisrepresents mainstream explanations for the enclave-employment paradox by testing M ogens Camre and B ruce http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2008/iss1/6
Bawer's claims. This is because Camre and Bawer represent two sides of what is ultimately the same anti-inunigration position.7They only represent the far-right portion of the public discourse on inunigration. Because this paper does not evaluate a broader range of explanations, it risks being irrelevant to the mainstream discourse.
Despite these lirnitations, this paper contributes to the immigration debate by pinpointing where hyperbole ends and the core problem begins. This paper considers and counters three provocative and increasingly popular parts of the anti-inunigration position. First, the anti-inunigration camp insists that others take their claims seriously and not write them off as racist. In response to this request, tlus paper tests their culture claim and concludes that culture is likely a part of the enclave paradox. Their culture claim is not necessarily racist rhetoric, but it is perhaps a bit overblown. Second, this camp predicts economic collapse for countries that continue to allow non-western ilTUnigration. They claim that the only solutions are complete repatriation or massive culture change (Camre 2006, 177, 211) . The evidence in this paper proves these claims to be exaggerated and inaccurate. Enclaves are not the result of inunigrant culture as much as they are a product of inunigrant economic preferences. In addition, institutions have and can continue to improve conditions in immigrant enclaves. Tlurd, this camp contends that native institutions reflect a latent bigotry by pillarizing society. This paper counters this claim by providing evidence that immigrant decisions, not native institutions, largely account for the development of enclaves. In sum, there is ample evidence to suggest that institutions can improve employment rates in inmugrant enclaves by providing resources to refugees. Therefore, while Denmark should not discard culture as a cause, it should not let it distract policy decisions. In short, the hype about enclaves should not divert the focus on refugees.
END NOTES
immigrants after 1999. These municipalities include Copenhagen, Arhus, Odense, Aalborg, Skive, Kolding, and Esbj erg. This suggests that current policy seeks a more even distribution of inunigrants throughout the country.
ApPENDIX B
This map shows the distribution of ilmnigrants that moved for the first time from 1997 to 2005 (Nielsen and Jensen 2006,41 There is a clear tendency for ilmnigrants to move to cities with large inunigrant
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